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Casenote

Albany Urology Clinic, P.C. v. Cleveland:
Why You Should Always Ask Your Urologist
if He Is a Cocaine Addict

In Albany Urology Clinic, P.C. v. Cleveland,' the Georgia Supreme
Court ruled that neither state common law nor Georgia's informed
consent statutes require physicians affirmatively to disclose negative
personal life factors, such as illegal drug use, before treating patients.2
Consequently, patients injured during certain surgical or diagnostic
procedures are severely impeded from pursuing an action of fraud or
battery against physicians who fail to divulge their illegal drug use
during the course of their patients' medical treatment.

I.

FACTS

William Cleveland filed suit in the superior court of Dougherty County
against urologist Timothy Trulock and his practice, Albany Urology
Clinic, P.C., for medical negligence. Alternatively, Cleveland alleged
fraudulent concealment and misrepresentation, as well as battery claims.
Cleveland consulted with Trulock in 1993 about a lump on the underside
of his penis. Trulock erroneously diagnosed the lump as cancerous and

1.
2.

272 Ga. 296, 528 S.E.2d 777 (2000).
Id. at 296-97, 528 S.E.2d at 778.
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recommended surgical removal.3 Trulock described the procedure to
Cleveland, saying, "This is simple. I'll make a half-inch incision ....
I'll give you a couple of stitches, and you'll be back to work Monday
morning."4 Because it was necessary to put Cleveland under general
anesthesia, Cleveland signed an informed consent statement asserting
that he had been apprised of all the required factors set out in the
Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") section 31-9-6.1(d). After
the surgery, Cleveland experienced a painful ninety-degree curvature of
his penis upon obtaining an erection, and thus was unable to have
sexual intercourse. Cleveland had suffered no such trouble before the
operation.5
Cleveland brought suit, claiming that Dr. Trulock performed an
unnecessary and unwanted medical procedure. Charles Horton, Jr.,
M.D., an expert witness, testified at trial that the lump was caused by
Peyronie's Disease, a common benign condition usually treated with
Vitamin E supplements. Dr. Horton further testified that Trulock
"breached the applicable standard of care in both his diagnosis and
treatment."' Cleveland's medical records prepared by Dr. Trulock,
including the consent form Cleveland had signed, indicated that Trulock
had failed to consider a possible diagnosis of Peyronie's Disease. Todd
Jarrell, M.D., another expert witness, testified that this failure "deviated
from the proper standard of care" and that the scar left on Cleveland's
penis from the surgery likely caused the abnormal curvature.7
Cleveland also asserted that Dr. Trulock "had fraudulently concealed
or misrepresented his 'illegal use and abuse of cocaine, substance abuse
problem, and impairment' at the time of [his] treatment."' Dr. Trulock's
drug use became known when he suffered a cocaine-induced seizure, and
had to be admitted to the emergency room of an Atlanta hospital.9 At
trial Trulock selectively answered questions concerning his drug
addiction but allegedly admitted "that he deliberately and intentionally
concealed his cocaine use from all his 10,000 patients because he
intended for them to believe that he did not use cocaine." 10 To the

3. Id. at 297, 528 S.E.2d at 778.
4. Cleveland v. Albany Urology Clinic, P.C., 235 Ga. App. 838,843 n.5, 509 S.E.2d 664,
669 n.5 (1998).
5. 272 Ga. at 297, 528 S.E.2d at 778.
6. 235 Ga. App. at 839, 509 S.E.2d at 666.
7. Id. at 841, 509 S.E.2d at 668.
8. 272 Ga. at 297, 528 S.E.2d at 778.
9. Supplemental Brief of the Respondents at 15, Albany Urology Associates v.
Cleveland, 272 Ga. 296, 528 S.E.2d 777 (2000).
10. Brief of Respondents at 2, Albany Urology Associates v. Cleveland, 272 Ga. 296, 528
S.E.2d 777 (2000).
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question, "'When's the last time you used cocaine before you operated on
Mr. Cleveland,'" Trulock answered "that he did not 'have a clue.'""'
When he was asked, "'We're not ever going to get you to tell us the
whole truth about your cocaine use, are we?' Trulock answered, 'No,
sir.'" 12 Throughout his deposition and trial testimony, Trulock purportedly invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
over a hundred times in response to questions concerning his drug use
in connection with his treatment of patients. 3 Cleveland testified that
if he had known Trulock was using cocaine at 4the time of his treatment,
he would not have consented to the surgery.
Before trial, the superior court dismissed Cleveland's battery claim,
finding it defective under O.C.G.A. section 31-9-6.1(a). The trial court
also prohibited Cleveland from introducing evidence of a prior lawsuit
that would have allowed a jury to infer that Trulock's medical judgment
was impaired by his cocaine use. The jury found for the defendants on
the medical malpractice claim, but awarded $650,000 in compensatory
damages and $35,000 in punitive damages after finding that Trulock had
fraudulently misrepresented and/or concealed material facts from
Cleveland. The superior court granted defendants' motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict ("j.n.o.v.") holding that the plaintiff's fraud
claim failed as a matter of law for the following reasons: (1) neither
O.C.G.A. section 31-9-6.1, nor Georgia's common law imposed a duty
upon doctors to reveal illegal drug use; and (2) the evidence failed to
prove that there was any intent to harm Cleveland, thus barring a
recovery for fraud.' 5
On appeal the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed both the superior
court's grant of j.n.o.v. and the dismissal of the battery claim.' 6 The
court of appeals reasoned that when a confidential relationship like a
doctor-patient relationship exists, failure to disclose material information, such as drug abuse, constitutes fraudulent and willful misrepresentation. 7 Absent Cleveland's knowledge that Trulock was using cocaine,

11. 235 Ga. App. at 841, 509 S.E.2d at 667.
12. Id.
13. Brief of Respondents, supra note 10, at 23. It is important to note that in a civil
trial, the jury may draw all inferences again8t a person who claims their Fifth Amendment
privilege. O.C.G.A. § 24-4-22 (1995); In re Meier, 256 Ga. 72, 75, 344 S.E.2d 212, 214
(1986).
14. 235 Ga. App. at 841, 509 S.E.2d at 668.
15. Id. at 839, 509 S.E.2d at 666-67.
16. 272 Ga. at 297-98, 628 S.E.2d at 779.
17. 235 Ga. App. at 840, 509 S.E.2d at 667.
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Cleveland's consent to the surgery was vitiated because it was uninformed; therefore, the court upheld his battery claim.18
The Supreme Court of Georgia granted defendants' motion for
certiorari to determine whether a patient is "authorized to bring a claim
against a physician for the latter's failure to disclose his use of illegal
drugs," and specifically whether such a failure could support Cleveland's
claims for fraud and battery. 9 The supreme court held that absent a
patient's or client's direct inquiry, professionals have no statutory or
common law duty to "disclose to their patients or clients unspecified life
factors which might be subjectively considered to adversely affect the
professional's performance." 20 Thus, a claim for fraud or battery cannot
be maintained solely on this failure to disclose."'
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

The informed consent doctrine, which holds that "a consent to a
treatment or diagnostic test obtained without disclosure of the hazards
or dangers involved, is no consent,"22 is rooted in both battery and
negligence actions. A claim for medical battery may be brought when a
plaintiff was not informed of the nature of the medical touching; as with
all battery claims, she does not have to prove that an actual injury
occurred from the uninformed touching." An example of this is when
a patient consents to an appendectomy, but the surgeon performs a
tonsillectomy. Additionally, a surgeon who receives a patient's consent
to a medical procedure through fraud or deceit may be liable to the
patient under a theory of battery.24 However, in most states a medical
battery claim is only permissible when there has been absolutely no
consent to the medical procedure.25 Generally speaking, punitive
damages are appropriate in a medical battery case when there has been
deceit, a breach of fiduciary duty, a total disregard for the patient's
wishes, or gross recklessness.2"
In recent years, most cases based upon a patient's uninformed consent
to the risks of a medical procedure have arisen in negligence, rather

18. Id. at 842-43, 509 S.E.2d at 669.
19. 272 Ga. at 296, 528 S.E.2d at 778.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Mull v. Emory Univ., Inc., 114 Ga. App. 63, 65-66, 150 S.E.2d 276, 292 (1966).
23. 1 BARRY R. FURROW, ET. AL., HEALTH LAW 410 (1995).
24. Id. at 411.
25. Id. Pennsylvania is currently the only state that allows for a battery claim to be
established if a doctor does not obtain a patient's fully informed consent prior to treatment.

Id.
26. Id. at 411-12.

2001]

ALBANY UROLOGY V CLEVELAND

1163

than battery.27 This trend reflects a judicial movement towards
allowing doctors more medical discretion. 2' Because these cases are
founded in negligence theories, a standard for medical disclosures to
patients must be established by which to judge an individual doctor's
conduct.29 Some states have preferred a standard that is determined
by the doctor's professional peers, requiring a plaintiff to produce expert
testimony regarding what a similarly situated doctor would disclose
under similar circumstances. 3 Other states have opted for a reasonable person standard, assessing what a reasonable patient would want
to know before consenting to a medical procedure and weighing the
doctor's disclosures against that criteria.3' Importantly, no state has
ever employed a subjective person standard to the question of whether
a doctor has adequately informed her patient about a medical procedure.3 2
The Georgia courts left open the question of whether the informed
consent rule applied to the state's common law until 1966. In 1966 the
court of appeals first touched on the issue in obiter dicta in Mull v.
Emory University.33 In Mull plaintiff alleged in part that her doctor
failed to inform her adequately of the risks inherent in the diagnostic
procedure to which she consented because the doctor did not tell her
what would foreseeably happen if the procedure went awry.34 The
court of appeals, while declining to decide whether informed consent
applied to Georgia law, held that even if informed consent was incorporated into Georgia common law physicians would only be required to
disclose "the hazards of a correct and proper procedure" and would have
no duty to warn of the dangers of an improperly performed procedure. 5
In 1971 the General Assembly enacted the Georgia Medical Consent
Law.3" Section 31-9-6(d) of this statute provides: "A consent to
surgical or medical treatment which discloses in general terms the
treatment or course of treatment in connection with which it is given...
shall be conclusively presumed to be a valid consent in the absence of

27. Id. at 412.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 413.
31. Id. at 412.
32. Id. at 415.
33. 114 Ga. App. 63, 150 S.E.2d 276.
34. Id. at 65-66, 150 S.E.2d at 292.
35. Id.
36. Georgia Medical Consent Law, 1971 Ga. Laws 438-41 (codified as amended at
O.C.G.A. § 31-9-6 (1996)).
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fraudulent misrepresentations of material facts . . . ."7 The appellate
court in Young v. Yarn"8 interpreted this section to mean that physicians must reveal the general nature of their patients' treatment, but are
not required "to warn of the risks of treatment" to obtain valid consent
from the patient.3 9 Thus, the court implicitly rejected the doctrine of
informed consent.
The courts unanimously followed Young, holding that "there was no
cause of action for informed consent in Georgia" 40 despite criticism that
Georgia was the only state to eschew the informed consent rule.4 The
appellate court in Simpson v. Dickson42 recognized the controversy
surrounding Georgia's reluctance to adopt the informed consent doctrine,
but stated: "'If this Court has been wrong from the beginning on this
subject, let the legislative power be invoked to prescribe a new rule for
the future .... ,"'a Finally, in 1988 the General Assembly adopted
O.C.G.A. section 31-9-6.1. 44 Section (a) of this statute "sets forth six
specified categories of information that must be disclosed by medical care
providers to their patients before they undergo certain specified surgical
or diagnostic procedures."45 Unfortunately, the narrow scope of this
statute provides little protection to the many patients who undergo more
general, yet inherently risky, medical procedures.
O.C.G.A. section 31-9-6.1(d) additionally provides that "failure to
comply with the requirements of this Code section shall not constitute

37. O.C.G.A. § 31-9-6(d).
38. 136 Ga. App. 737, 222 S.E.2d 113 (1975), overruled by Ketchup v. Howard, No.
A00A0987, 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS 1418 (Nov. 29,2000) (holding that the plastic surgeon had
no duty to warn the face-lift patient of the possibility of post-operative hypertrophic
scarring). Young was overruled in November 2000 by the court in Ketchup. See infra note
82 and accompanying text.
39. 136 Ga. App. at 739, 222 S.E.2d at 114.
40. Campbell v. United States, 795 F. Supp. 1127, 1130 (N.D. Ga. 1991); see also
Padgett v. Ferrier, 172 Ga. App. 335, 335, 323 S.E.2d 166, 166 (1984).
41. 61 AM. JUR. 2D, Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers § 187 (1981).
42. 167 Ga. App. 344, 347, 306 S.E.2d 404, 407 (1983).
43. Id. (quoting Adams v. Brooks, 35 Ga. 63, 66 (1866)).
44. Health-Informed Consent to Surgical, Medical, or Diagnostic Procedures; Causes

of Action; Rules and Regulations, 1988 Ga. Laws 1443-47 (codified as amended at O.C.G.A.
§ 31-9-6.1 (1996)).

45. Albany Urology Clinic, 272 Ga. at 298, 528 S.E.2d at 779. Patients who undergo
surgery while under general or spinal anesthesia, or diagnostic procedures involving
intravenous or intraductal injection of a contrast material shall be informed of: (1) a
diagnosis of the condition requiring the procedure; (2) the nature and purpose of such
proposed procedure; (3) the material risks of the procedure generally recognized and
accepted by reasonably prudent physicians; (4) the likelihood of the procedure's success; (5)

the practical alternatives to the procedure; and (6) the prognosis of the patient's condition
if the procedure is not undertaken. O.C.G.A. § 31-9-6.1(a)(1)-(6).
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a separate cause of action but may give rise to an action for medical
malpractice."4 The court of appeals has held, however, that when a
patient does not authorize a medical procedure, O.C.G.A. section 31-96.1(d) will not preclude an action for battery against the treating
doctor.47 A signed consent form that adheres to the requirements of
O.C.G.A. section 31-9-6.1(a) merely creates a rebuttable presumption of
a patient's consent to a medical or diagnostic procedure. 48
This
presumption may be overcome by proving that the responsible physician
fraudulently misrepresented material facts of the procedure. 49 However, if a doctor does obtain "valid consent, but fails to provide each
disclosure required by OCGA § 31-9-6.1, the failure to strictly comply
with [the statute] does not give rise to a separate cause of action for
battery. Thus, for a battery claim, the issue remains whether the doctor
obtained valid consent." °

III. THE CouRT's RATIONALE
The supreme court granted certiorari to decide in part whether
professionals have a duty to disclose negative personal life factors that
could impair their performance and in part whether the nondisclosure
of those factors gives rise to an action for battery and/or fraud.5' In a
six to three decision, the supreme court held that physicians in Georgia
have no duty to disclose such negative factors and that nondisclosure of
these factors would not substantiate a claim of fraud or battery.52
Justice Carley, with Justices Thompson and Hunstein, concurred that
nondisclosure of the factors enumerated in O.C.G.A. section 31-9-6.1(a)
could not give rise to an action of fraud, but dissented from the
majority's holding that Cleveland could not recover on a claim for
battery."3
Despite the assertion made in O.C.G.A. section 31-9-6(a) that "Itihis
chapter shall be liberally construed,"5 4 the court determined that the
specific provisions of O.C.G.A. section 31-9-6.1(a) must be strictly

46. O.C.G.A. § 31-9-6.1(d).
47. Gillis v. Cardio TVP Surgical Assocs., P.C., 239 Ga. App. 350, 353, 520 S.E.2d 767,
771 (1999), rev'd, Cardio TVP Surgical Assocs., P.C. v. Gillis, 272 Ga. 404, 528 S.E.2d 785
(2000).

48. Tuten v. Costrini, 238 Ga. App. 350, 350, 518 S.E.2d 751, 752 (1999), overruled by
Ezor v. Thompson, 241 Ga. App. 275, 526 S.E.2d 609 (1999).
49. O.C.G.A. § 31-9-6.1(d).
50. 239 Ga. App. at 354, 520 S.E.2d at 771.
51. Albany Urology Clinic, 272 Ga. at 298, 528 S.E.2d at 779.

52. Id. at 296, 528 S.E.2d at 778.
53. Id. at 303, 528 S.E.2d at 783 (Carley, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

54. O.C.G.A. § 31-9-6(a).
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construed because they are in derogation of "the common law rule
against requiring physicians to disclose medical risks to their patients.""5 The supreme court thus held it was "without authority to
impose disclosure requirements upon physicians in addition to those
requirements already set forth by the General Assembly."5" Therefore,
O.C.G.A. section 31-9-6.1 may not be construed to require a doctor to
warn patients of potential personal factors that could negatively affect
his performance.
Because the court held that Dr. Trulock had no affirmative duty to
disclose any aspect of his personal life, Cleveland's claim for fraud based
on Trulock's nondisclosure of his cocaine addiction was thus unsubstantiated.57 Accordingly, the supreme court reversed the court of appeals
ruling.58
In the absence of any fraudulent conduct on Trulock's behalf,
Cleveland's battery claim was similarly rejected. 59 However, the
supreme court held that a claim for battery may survive when a
physician has obtained consent to treatment by misrepresenting a factor
directly related to the patient-doctor relationship.6" Therefore, one may
construe that a patient's consent would be deemed invalid if a doctor
misrepresents a patient's diagnosis or treatment, or if a doctor fails to
respond truthfully to a patient's questions. Nonetheless, the court
declined to allow a patient to pursue a claim for battery for failure to
disclose a negative personal factor when (1) the undisclosed factor is
unrelated to the professional relationship and would only impact the
patient's consent to be treated because of that patient's subjectively held
beliefs, and (2) "there is no direct evidence of record that the physician
was impaired or affected by the negative personal life factor at the time
consent was obtained and treatment was rendered."6 Although the
court did not question that Cleveland would have refused surgery had
he known Trulock was taking drugs, the court took exception with the
record's failure to establish a causal nexus between Trulock's drug use
and Cleveland's consent to treatment and the resulting injury. 2
Stating "we cannot allow a cause of action for battery to be based upon
pure speculation that such a nexus exists," the supreme court decided

55. 272 Ga. at 299, 528 S.E.2d at 780.

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 300-01, 528 S.E.2d at 781.
Id. at 301, 528 S.E.2d at 781.
Id.
Id.
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that Trulock's cocaine habit "[was] too attenuated from the subject
matter of the professional relationship to support a battery claim.""3
The court also reasoned that public policy would not support a holding
that professionals be required to disclose negative personal issues before
obtaining valid consent from their clients.64 First, because each client
is unique, it would be nearly impossible to determine what would
subjectively impact each client's decision.6 5 Thus, in the absence of any
good guidelines, a professional may be required to reveal every minute
and private aspect of her life before touching upon a subject that the
client considers relevant. 6 Second, even the imposition of guidelines
relating what a professional must and may not disclose would depend so
largely upon the particular profession, the "services being rendered, and
S..

the subjective beliefs" of the client, that they would raise constitu-

tional vagueness questions and would be simply impracticable to
accomplish. 7
Justice Carley in an opinion concurring and dissenting in part, with
which Justices Hunstein and Thompson joined, agreed with the majority
that Trulock's nondisclosure of his drug use could not give rise to an
independent tort of fraud." Nonetheless, Carley wrote that Trulock's
concealment of his drug use was done deliberately, as Trulock had so
testified, and thus constituted a material misrepresentation that would
vitiate Cleveland's consent to the procedure.69 Unconvinced by the
supreme court's rationale that O.C.G.A section 31-9-6.1(a) did not
specifically include negative life factors as one of the risks of treatment
of which patients should be apprised, Carley wrote:
the General Assembly's mandated disclosure of the general and
inherent risks of a medical procedure does not indicate a legislative
intent to insulate a physician from liability for the fraudulent concealment of any and all other forms of risks to the patient. In my opinion,
the concept of valid consent to undergo a medical procedure encompasses more than the procedure itself, and includes the qualifications or
lack thereof of the one who is proposing himself as the professional who
will perform that procedure.7"

63. Id.

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id., 528 S.E.2d at 781-82.
Id. at 301-02, 528 S.E.2d at 781-82.
Id.
Id. at 302 n.19, 528 S.E.2d at 782 n.19.
Id. at 303, 528 S.E.2d at 783 (Carley, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

69. Id. at 304, 305, 528 S.E.2d at 783, 784.
70. Id. at 304, 528 S.E.2d at 783.
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Thus, Carley reasoned that O.C.G.A. section 31-9-6.1(a) has no bearing
on the issue at hand, namely whether Trulock's concealment of his
71
cocaine use was material to Cleveland's consent to treatment.
Because O.C.G.A. section 31-9-6.1(a) did not obviate Trulock's duty to
disclose his drug addiction to Cleveland, Carley noted that Trulock's
concealment of his drug use was not "clearly and palpably immaterial"
to Cleveland's consent to the surgery.72 Therefore, Carley asserts that
a "jury [would be] authorized to believe Mr. Cleveland's contention that
the undisclosed cocaine use was material to his decision to accept Dr.
Trulock's recommendation, [and] neither the trial court nor this Court
is authorized to conclude" that the consent was valid. 3
Eschewing the majority's public policy argument, Carley stressed that
this decision would necessarily be factually limited and that given the
facts of this case the test of whether Cleveland would have subjectively
decided to refuse the surgery is irrelevant.7 4 Carley surmised:
Trulock has violated the beliefs and standards of society in general and
his profession in specific. Regardless of where the line ultimately is
drawn [of what a doctor must disclose], Dr. Trulock crossed that line
when he obtained Mr. Cleveland's consent without disclosing a factor
which could result in the doctor's
criminal prosecution and put his
75
professional license in jeopardy.
IV.

IMPLICATIONS

The Supreme Court of Georgia appears to have left the door open to
a successful suit for battery for plaintiffs who can prove both that (1)
their professional's nondisclosures objectively impacted upon their
consent and (2) the professional was adversely affected by this negative
personal life factor while consent was being obtained and treatment was
being rendered. In this case, however, Dr. Trulock admitted that he
habitually used cocaine for a full twenty years, a length of time that
spanned his entire medical career, and still this admission did not
satisfy the supreme court that Dr. Trulock was negatively affected by
cocaine during the time he treated Mr. Cleveland. Moreover, because
Trulock invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege when asked about his
drug use while he treated his patients, the jury should have been
entitled to construe this refusal to answer as an admission of Trulock's

71. Id. at 304-05, 528 S.E.2d at 784.

72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 305, 528 S.E.2d at 784.
Id. at 305-06, 528 S.E.2d at 784.
Id. at 305, 528 S.E.2d at 784.
Id.
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drug-related impairment when treating Cleveland.76 Thus, according
to the supreme court's decision in Cleveland, the burden of proving the
second element of this claim is nearly impossible. Albeit, the Dougherty
County Medical Society shares the supreme court's opinion that
persistent cocaine abuse has no per se negative impact upon a doctor's
performance; the Society elected Trulock president less than a year after
he was discharged from his rehabilitation center.7"
Ironically, in the same year that Cleveland was decided, this same
court held per curiam in In re Watkins v" that a lawyer may be disbarred for entering into a business deal with a client when the lawyer's
and the client's interests are adverse if the client has an expectation that
the lawyer is working for the client's best interests and the client has
not given his informed consent to the business arrangement.7 9 Similarly, the supreme court in 1998 upheld the disbarment of an attorney for
the same kind of misconduct perpetrated by Dr. Trulock, even though no
client was harmed by the attorney's drug use and the attorney voluntarily sought treatment for his addiction."0 Apparently the supreme court,
among other entities, believes that a lawyer's duty to preserve the best
fiduciary interests of her clients is more important than a doctor's duty
to preserve her clients' health and physical well being.8 '
In November of 2000, the appellate court overruled Young in Ketchup
v. Howard,8 2 thus ruling that the informed consent doctrine will apply
to Georgia law prospectively from the date of its decision. 3 The court
in Ketchup held that when deciding Young the 1975 court of appeals
misconstrued the language of O.C.G.A. section 31-9-6 as pertaining to
informed consent as a negligence theory (when consent is obtained
without full knowledge of the inherent risks).8 4 In Ketchup the court
found that the legislature intended the statute to apply to medical
battery cases (when consent to the medical touching is never ob-

76. Brief of Respondents, supra note 13, at 23.
77. Supplemental Brief of the Respondents, supra note 9, at 19.
78. 272 Ga. 769, 534 S.E.2d 794 (2000).
79. Id. at 769-71, 534 S.E.2d at 794-96.
80. In re Swearingen, 269 Ga. 515, 516-17, 501 S.E.2d 200, 201 (1998).
81. The Author acknowledges that the legal standard for upholding damage awards
differs from the standard used to uphold an attorney's disbarment. However, the practical
effect of this court's decisions is that for similar conduct an attorney will lose her livelihood
while a doctor could potentially have to file an award for redress with her malpractice
insurance company. Perhaps a comparison is in order between the Bar's and Medical
Board's standards and their enforcement of those standards for current members.
82. No. A00A0987, 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS 1418 (Nov. 29, 2000).
83. Id. at *3.
84. Id. at *5-7.
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tained)."5 The court of appeals recognized that all other forty-nine
states in the United States employ either a professional standard or
reasonable person standard by which to judge the doctor's own disclosures to her patient," and from the legislative language of O.C.G.A.
section 31-9-6.1, the court of appeals concluded that the Georgia
legislature favors adopting the reasonable person standard. 7 The
supreme court has not yet reviewed the holding in Ketchup, plausibly
because the court of appeals decision to apply the informed consent
doctrine prospectively to Georgia common law makes Ketchup itself an
unlikely case to be presented to the supreme court for consideration.
When this point of law does present itself for review, it will be interesting to ascertain whether a majority of the Georgia Supreme Court will,
or can, continue to evade implementing a doctrine that has long been
law in every other state in the Union."8
KATE SIEVERT COOK

85. Id.
86. By recognizing that all other states employ something other than a subjective
person standard to assess what a medical professional should disclose to her patient, the
court of appeals has acknowledged what both the majority of the supreme court in
Cleveland and the Medical Association of Georgia has failed to admit. The majority wrote
that public policy would not allow for the implications of requiring a medical professional
to disclose anything personal to a patient, because the floodgates would proverbially
open-allowing for any of the physician's minute personal details to be fair game for a
litigious patient. The Medical Association of Georgia wrote in its online update concerning
Albany Urology Clinic v. Cleveland and the amicus curiae brief it filed, "The Court also
agreed with MAG [Medical Association of Georgia] that there would be no other way to
define, or in any other way limit, the categories of personal information that the physician
would have to voluntarily disclose [sic] under the decision of the Court of Appeals." The
article concluded that "[t]his is a significant VICTORY for physicians." [emphasis in
original]. GA Supreme Court Agrees to MAG's Request to Reject "FraudulentConcealment"
Tort (visited March 15, 2001) <www.mag.org/legislative-affairs/Complaints/trulock.update.htm>.
87. 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS at *24-25.
88. See id. at *33-52.

